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Abstract
The consequences of tobacco control policies for individual welfare are difficult to assess.
We therefore evaluate the impact of smoking bans and cigarette prices on subjective well-
being by analyzing data for 40 European countries and regions between 1990 and 2011. We
exploit the staggered introduction of bans and apply an imputation strategy to study the
effect of anti-smoking policies on people with different propensities to smoke. We find that
higher cigarette prices reduce the life satisfaction of likely smokers. Overall, smoking bans
are not related to subjective well-being, but increase the life satisfaction of smokers who
recently failed to quit smoking. The latter finding is consistent with cue-triggered models of
addiction and the idea of bans as self-control devices.
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control policies
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1 Introduction
Adverse health effects of smoking motivate tobacco control policies in many countries. Smok-
ing bans are introduced at workplaces as well as in restaurants, bars and clubs. Excise taxes
are levied on tobacco products that drive up prices. These policies are controversial though as
people hold fundamentally different views about their welfare consequences which are difficult
to assess based on observed behavior alone.1 Theoretical accounts, whether from a traditional
or a behavioral economic perspective, generally imply that smoking is reduced if the mentioned
tobacco control policies are in place. However, the competing theories predict potentially differ-
ent consequences on the individual welfare of smokers. More fundamentally, the complexity of
the phenomenon renders any prediction about welfare consequences rather difficult. We there-
fore evaluate the policies’ impact based on reports of subjective well-being. We draw on the
experience in Europe over more than twenty years with generally increasing cigarette prices and
the staggered introduction of smoking bans in the EU member countries.
According to the traditional economic view (pioneered in the domain of addictive goods by
Becker and Murphy, 1988), public health interventions constrain smokers in their habits, and
this tends to make them worse off, while non-smokers are expected to benefit, given that the
policies successfully internalize social costs. However, the prediction for smokers differs if a
behavioral economics perspective is applied, which takes into account that some people are
unable to realize their desired consumption plan. Some smokers may face self-control problems
and are therefore unable to make short-term decisions according to their long-term preferences.
For them, policies that restrict smoking through either higher prices or bans may have a positive
impact on individual well-being. According to the models of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and
Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001, 2004), high cigarette prices serve as a self-control device and enhance
the welfare of people with limited willpower. In contrast, the models of Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001) and Bernheim and Rangel (2004) predict that higher prices will have a negative welfare
effect on smokers, as they do not help to reduce overconsumption for given levels of addiction.
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) emphasize environmental cues that trigger choices with addictive
goods. In their model, successful policy interventions have to protect people from tempting
situations. Smoking bans might serve such a purpose.
With regard to non-smokers, competing welfare predictions emerge for other reasons. At first
sight, non-smokers seem to be better off with bans and cigarette taxes, as these policies reduce the
overall level of smoking. However, smoking bans might lead to negative side effects such as the
displacement of smoking from the targeted public places to officially unregulated private places.
Smoking bans may then have negative welfare effects even for non-smokers. Any evaluation of
1On the economics of smoking and tobacco policy, see, e.g., Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Cnossen (2006),
Gruber (2001) and Viscousi (1992).
2
tobacco control policies must therefore consider heterogeneous effects across groups of people
and devise measures capable of capturing individual welfare.
We study the effects of tobacco control policies on individual welfare by analyzing reported
satisfaction with life. We exploit repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys
which covers 629,930 individuals from 40 European countries and regions between 1990 and 2011.
The staggered introduction of smoking bans in the different countries and regions enables us to
study the effect of the bans on individual life satisfaction in a difference-in-differences framework.
The investigation of the ban introduction process does not indicate concurring (health) policy
interventions (the common trend assumption is thus not rejected) and the developments of life
satisfaction in regions and countries that do not introduce smoking bans in a given point of
time can be studied as counterfactuals. The variation in cigarette prices over time is exploited
to identify the consequences of higher prices on subjective well-being. Thereby, the rich data
pool allows us to take into account unobserved country-specific effects, survey wave-specific
effects, as well as country-specific time trends and macro-economic conditions. To address the
concern that other policies of government health prevention might still be correlated with our
variables of interest, we statistically control for a set of additional tobacco control policies such
as restrictions on advertising and for anti-alcohol policies in terms of taxation.
In order to go beyond average treatment effects and to study the treatment effects for different
groups such as likely smokers and non-smokers, the selection into a particular smoking status
is taken into account. As tobacco control policies affect smoking status, people who indicate to
be smokers pre and post intervention are not comparable. Some marginal smokers might quit
and are thus no longer observed in the group of smokers after the intervention. Any measured
difference in subjective well-being for actual smokers thus compounds a possible treatment
effect and a selection effect. In our analysis, we instead concentrate on a counterfactual smoking
status of every person in the sample for the case that there is no smoking ban and cigarette
prices are low. For this, we analyze the covariates of someone being a smoker in an auxiliary
dataset and impute an individuals propensity to smoke pre intervention in our main dataset.
This imputation strategy is also applied to identify smokers who recently tried to stop smoking
but failed. People in this latter category are deemed to suffer from weak willpower. This is
applied as an indicator for the heterogeneity in individual levels of self-control in order to test
the predictions of behavioral economic models.
We find, on average, no systematic partial correlation between the introduction of smoking bans
and people’s reported life satisfaction. There is also no systematic pattern for people with a high
or low propensity to smoke. However, people categorized as smokers who have recently tried to
quit smoking but have failed, report a higher level of subjective well-being when smoking bans
are in place. For these people, roughly a third of the smokers according to surveys, smoking
bans might serve as a self-control device that helps them to pursue their preferred consumption
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plan.
Overall, higher cigarette prices are statistically weakly related to a lower level of reported sub-
jective well-being. Thereby, large and statistically significant negative effects of higher prices on
the life satisfaction of likely smokers drive the correlation, whereas non-smokers are not affected
by higher prices. Within the group of smokers, even people who want to give up smoking suffer
from higher prices in terms of reduced subjective well-being. This finding is contrary to the
prominent result published in the study by Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) that tobacco taxes
are positively related to smokers’ happiness. It also questions the idea that higher tobacco taxes
act as an effective self-control device. The differential effects of smoking bans and higher prices
on smokers who would like to quit are consistent with models of addiction based on cue-triggered
decision processes.
In Section 2, we discuss the main theoretical considerations that are related to the welfare
effects of tobacco control policies. We complement the arguments by incorporating the previous
evidence. Finally, we introduce our alternative empirical approach to measure individual welfare
based on reported subjective well-being. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 reports the
findings of our empirical analyses, and Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 Welfare Effects of Tobacco Control Policies
In order to understand the predictions on how smoking bans and high cigarette prices affect
people’s well-being, we highlight the alternative perspectives of traditional and behavioral eco-
nomic models. Subsequently, we refer to the previous evidence on the impact of tobacco policies
on smoking behavior and health outcomes. It reveals possible channels through which these
policies affect individual well-being and indicates indirect evidence on the policies potential as
self-control devices. We want to complement this important evidence that itself renders con-
clusions about net welfare effects difficult. We introduce our empirical approach in the third
subsection. Reported subjective well-being is proposed as a proxy measure of individual welfare.
2.1 Predictions of Traditional and Behavioral Economic Models
How do smoking bans and high cigarette prices affect people’s well-being? Traditional (welfare)
economics offers a clear framework in which smokers and non-smokers are in conflict regarding
the use of clean air. Since there are no clear entitlements to clean air, smokers who expose
third parties to smoke without agreement, smoke more than they would if they had to bear the
costs for their externalities. In such a situation, smoking bans might serve as an internalization
strategy with low transaction costs. Similar arguments apply to cigarette taxes in their capacity
to reduce the externalities of smoking. Overall, if social costs are successfully internalized by
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these policies, people should experience a higher level of overall welfare.
There are, of course, distributional consequences. Non-smokers are expected to be the primary
beneficiaries. In contrast, with smoking bans and cigarette taxes, smokers face additional con-
straints when they rationally pursue their consumption habits or addiction, and are therefore
potentially made worse off. This conclusion can be derived from the so-called rational addiction
model of Becker and Murphy (1988). It emphasizes that even for addictive goods, consump-
tion decisions can be understood as individually optimal. A positive net welfare effect of any
tobacco policy for smokers thus depends on whether negative consequences from a constrained
opportunity set are offset by the benefits of some internalization of the social costs of smoking.
However, a positive net effect is more likely to be predicted for smokers if they have difficulty
in pursuing their preferred consumption plan. This might be, for example, due to limited
willpower, where individuals smoke more than their (long-term) preferences would recommend.
They might even suffer a negative internality from their past behavior if an unforeseen addiction
is incurred. These people might search for self-control devices that help them to smoke less or
even to stop smoking altogether. This perspective from behavioral economics is the basis for
a series of theoretical models, where preferences with respect to smoking are time-inconsistent
and consumers mispredict the difficulty they have in stopping. Interestingly, these models make
systematically different predictions for the effectiveness of alternative tobacco policies to help
smokers who have limited self-control.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001, 2004) model self-control problems
in terms of a person’s conflicting short- and long-term preferences. Applied to their framework,
individuals plan to smoke less in the long run, but when it comes to act, they fail to follow their
plan. Under such circumstances, smoking bans as well as higher cigarette prices might serve as
self-control devices. They substantially increase the costs of smoking and thus reduce the need
to rely on willpower to adhere to a time-consistent consumption plan. Smoking bans and high
cigarette prices can thus enhance the welfare of people with limited self-control.2
In the model of Bernheim and Rangel (2004), the mistakes in consumption choices are triggered
by environmental cues, which are the result of previous experiences. Individuals operate either
in a ”hot” or a ”cold” decision-making mode. In the hot state, people have no self-control and
thus always consume the addictive good, irrespective of underlying preferences. In the cold
state, in contrast, decisions are following long-term plans. Within this approach, smoking bans
can help smokers to smoke less by reducing the occurrence of cues that bring them into a hot
state and trigger smoking. For instance, seeing someone smoke a cigarette in a pub would be a
cue that would entice the observer to smoke, and where self-restraint would demand substantial
willpower. A smoking ban might break this link and facilitate time-consistent decision-making.
2Regarding the optimal excise tax, these models suggest a tax greater than zero, even in the absence of smoking
externalities, due to self-control benefits for time-inconsistent agents (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006).
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In contrast, higher cigarette prices do not serve as a self-control device, because there is no
price elasticity in the hot state.3 Thus, the model predicts that smokers with limited willpower
will benefit from smoking bans, but will suffer from higher cigarette prices. Similar conclusions
follow from the model presented by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), where smokers experience
direct disutility from being tempted. This disutility can be at least partially avoided if smoking
bans are in place, because this policy measure excludes the possibility of smoking inside the
restaurant, bar or workplace from the option set. With cigarette taxes, this cannot be achieved.
In sum, depending on the assumed time consistency in smokers’ consumption behavior, different
predictions for the welfare consequences of anti-smoking policies emerge. This holds even though
the different models predict similar reactions to tobacco control policies in terms of smoking
behavior. Based on observed consumption behavior, it is thus very difficult to discriminate
between the theoretical perspectives. In the empirical analysis, we therefore study how people
fare with smoking bans and cigarette price increases. Previous research concentrates mainly on
the impact on smoking behavior and health outcomes and has not yet performed a distinctive
test of the welfare predictions of the underlying models.
2.2 Impact of Tobacco Policies on Smoking Behavior and Health Outcomes
The introduction of smoking bans and the increase of cigarette prices through excise taxes
have become the dominant policies applied in combatting the adverse health effects resulting
from tobacco consumption. An extensive body of literature studies the impact of these policies
on individual consumption behavior, passive smoking, and related health consequences. This
evidence reveals the various empirical channels through which tobacco control policies affect
individual welfare.
Passive Smoking and Health Effects
Usually, smoking is not a self-contained consumption activity: Other parties inhale second-hand
smoke and are exposed to the same carcinogens as active smokers. Therefore, besides motivating
smokers to either smoke fewer cigarettes or to cease smoking, another explanation used in the
public health debate for tobacco control policies is to protect people from environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS).
To assess the health effects of clean-air laws, empirical research has produced many studies
that investigate their association with hospital admissions. In a meta-analysis based on eleven
reports, Meyers et al. (2009) focus on hospital admissions for acute myocardial infarction,
which is most often assessed in studies. Overall, they find that the risk of acute myocardial
infarction is reduced by 17% following the introduction of a public smoking ban. The largest
3This applies as long as cigarettes are affordable for an individual and cigarette price increases do not decrease
the level of addiction to a sufficient extent in the long run due to reduced smoking in the cold state.
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effects are found for younger individuals and non-smokers. Based on a difference-in-differences
analysis for Great Britain, Pell et al. (2008) also report the largest effects for people who have
never smoked and for former smokers. These findings suggest that the positive health effects
of bans are primarily driven by the negative impact on the exposure to ETS. However, in a
large-scale analysis on workplace smoking bans for the United States, Shetty et al. (2011) find
no statistically significant short-term effects either on mortality or on hospital admissions for
myocardial infarction.4
Besides the reported health effects, several studies discuss potential negative side effects of
smoking bans and cigarette taxes. Adda and Cornaglia (2010) find for the United States that
smoke-free laws led to a displacement of smoking to places shared with non-smokers who then
experience increased exposure to ETS. However, in a related study for public-place smoking
bans in Canada, Carpenter et al. (2011) do not find evidence of a displacement effect to private
homes, while, as expected, exposure to ETS in bars and restaurants was reduced. Adaptive
but unintended behavior is also possible in reaction to higher cigarette prices. As Adda and
Cornaglia (2006, 2012) show, smokers compensate for tax hikes by extracting more nicotine per
cigarette, which in turn is detrimental to health.
Smoking Behavior
A number of studies explore the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes. In general, a negative
price elasticity is found, ranging from -0.3 to -0.5 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000), whereby
young individuals are more price-sensitive than older people and men are more price sensitive
than women (Cawley and Ruhm, 2012). However, in a study for the United States, refined
estimates of elasticities are found to be around -0.1 and thus rather small if complementary
state-specific tobacco control policies are taken into account (Tauras, 2006).
The effects of spatial smoke-free policies on cigarette smoking have also been widely analyzed.
In a systematic review of 26 studies, Fichtenberg and Glantz (2002) report an average reduction
in the prevalence of smoking of 3.8 percentage points and of cigarettes smoked of 3.1 percent
for continuing smokers. In another review of 21 studies, Hopkins et al. (2010) report at the
median a decline in the prevalence of tobacco use of 3.4 percentage points. But, similar to
the studies on prices, the findings differ widely across studies, and recent analyses with refined
identification strategies have found smaller effects: In a comprehensive study across states in the
U.S., Adda and Cornaglia (2010) find no statistically robust effect of bans, either in workplaces
or in bars and restaurants, on cigarette consumption and smoking cessation. Regarding smoking
bans in the hospitality sector in the German Laender, Anger et al. (2011) find a reduction of
cigarette consumption only for individuals who frequently go to restaurants. However, even if
4In a simulation of smaller studies, Shetty et al. (2011) find effects that range from steep declines in hospital
admissions to large increases, which thus reflect the wide year-to-year variation in myocardial infarction death in
small geographic areas.
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we observe reduced consumption due to the tobacco policies, we can not draw any conclusion
about the welfare consequences of such behavioral changes. They depend on whether people
have difficulties in pursuing their preferred consumption plan or not.
Tobacco Control Policies as Collective Self-Binding Mechanisms
If systematic errors in tobacco consumption due to weak willpower are relevant, tobacco control
policies might help people to follow their preferred consumption plan. Kan (2007) provides
empirical evidence for the view that with limited willpower, smokers who want to cease smoking
have a demand for self-control devices. Based on survey data for Taiwan, he shows that a
smoker’s intention to quit smoking has a positive effect on his or her support for smoking bans
or for an increase in the cigarette excise tax. Hersch (2005) comes to the same conclusion in
support of clean-air laws in the United States. Additionally, he studies the effect for smokers
who have tried to quit smoking in the past, but having failed, and who plan to try again.
This group favors smoking bans more than smokers who plan to cease smoking for the first
time. Rather than attitudes, Fletcher et al. (2009) study elasticities to explore whether higher
cigarette prices might serve as a self-control device. They use U.S. data on adolescents in finite
mixture models to examine differences in cigarette tax elasticity for different levels of self-control.
They find that the biggest fraction of adolescents is sensitive to prices, while some are largely
unresponsive. The crucial point is that low responsiveness is strongly related to low levels of
self-control. This finding is consistent with theories of cue-triggered addiction suggesting that
higher cigarette prices do not serve as a self-control device.
2.3 Reported Subjective Well-Being as a Proxy Measure for Individual Wel-
fare
Previous evidence reveals that tobacco control policies have a multitude of behavioral conse-
quences affecting people’s health and welfare in various ways with sometimes countervailing
effects. Net welfare effects for different groups are very difficult to assess; even more so when
tobacco consumption is not time consistent. Therefore, we propose the analysis of subjective
well-being as a complementary approach to study the welfare consequences of policies in areas
that might involve suboptimal consumption choices.5 In particular, two extensions of the tradi-
tional emphasis on ex ante evaluation and observed decision-making are insightful in the study of
individual welfare. First, the standard economic concept of revealed preference is complemented
with the concept of a self-evaluation of the quality of life. This separation of concepts makes it
possible for us to systematically distinguish between judgments about experiences and ranked
options derived from observed behavior. The second extension is closely related and emphasizes
5For a general account see Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2008), Stutzer (2009) and Hsee et al. (2012). Introductions to
the economic analysis of subjective well-being are, e.g., provided in Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005) and
Stutzer and Frey (2010). Applications to suboptimal consumption choices are, e.g., Stutzer (2007) on obesity and
Benesch et al. (2010) on TV viewing.
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ex post evaluations as a valuable source of information about the possibility of bounded ratio-
nality in people’s decision-making. The key idea is thus that people’s self-evaluations of their
quality of life are captured as a proxy for their individual welfare.6
For tobacco taxes, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) perform an analysis with reported happiness
as a proxy for individual welfare. In two longitudinal analyses across states of the United States
and Canada, they analyze the effect of changes in state tobacco taxes on the reported happiness
of people who are predicted to smoke at the prevailing tobacco tax. They find that a real
cigarette tax of 50 cents7 significantly reduces the likelihood of being unhappy among those who
have a high propensity to smoke compared to those who have a low propensity to smoke. In
fact, smokers with a high propensity to smoke would be just as likely to report being unhappy
with a 50 cents tax as those with a low propensity to smoke (i.e., the proportion of smokers in
the lowest happiness category would fall by 7.5 percentage points). Brodeur (2012) applies the
same strategy to analyze the impact of smoking bans in the United States on people’s subjective
well-being. In initial results, he reports a positive effect of smoking bans in bars and restaurants
on people who are predicted to be smokers. As this effect is not robust to the inclusion of the
propensity to smoke of the smoker’s spouses, he concludes that within-family externalities are
present, which explains the main results.
Beside the replication of the analyses for the United States with data from the European Union,
we go beyond existing and emerging research by simultaneously analyzing the welfare effect of
smoking bans and cigarette prices. This allows us to assess the relative effectiveness of the two
policies not only for smokers and non-smokers, but also for smokers who failed to stop smoking
what potentially reveals a lack of sufficient willpower. This approach also enables us to test two
classes of models that are prominent in behavioral economics.
3 Data
3.1 Individual and Country Level Data
Our empirical analysis is based on individual-level data from the Eurobarometer surveys (EB)
that include a question on people’s subjective well-being (European Commission 2012). The
EB is a repeated cross-section survey in the member states of the European Union. Our anal-
ysis consists of 22 European countries; i.e., Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (Republic of), Denmark,
6Thereby, the standards underlying people’s judgments are assumed to be those that the individuals also
apply when pursuing their personal idea of a good life. Thus, the identification of differences in welfare hinges on
the presumption that individuals pursue personal welfare based on some stable evaluation standard. Moreover,
whether differences in welfare are properly identified depends on whether the evaluation metric fits people’s
self-evaluation of the quality of their lives.
7The average real (in 1999 USD) cigarette tax in the United States is 31.6 cents in the sample (Gruber and
Mullainathan 2005, 5).
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Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
For the United Kingdom, the entities England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and for
Germany, the 16 German Laender are considered as separate geographical units, since the smok-
ing bans were not introduced nationwide simultaneously in these places. We use data from 41
survey waves between 1990 and 2011. For Austria, Finland and Sweden data is only available
from the beginning of 1995 and for the newest members of the EU (i.e. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania) from the beginning of 2004.
Our dependent variable is based on a survey question on people’s life satisfaction. On a four-
point scale, people answer the question “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied,
not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. “Very satisfied” is coded as
four, “not at all satisfied” as one. The average satisfaction level in the sample is 3.05 with a
standard deviation of 0.74. Based on further survey questions, a number of socio-demographic
and socio-economic characteristics are taken into account. Table A.1 in the Appendix offers
descriptive statistics for the included individual-level variables from the EB and Table A.2 lists
the used surveys and data sources. From the listed survey waves, we include all observations
except for people who refused to indicate their marital status or who did not know their age
when they have finished their education. Individuals who do not report the number of children
in the household are indicated by a separate indicator. The final sample consists of 629,930
observations.
The empirical analysis takes a number of aggregate economic indicators into account as control
variables: i.e., the country-specific nominal GDP per capita, the inflation rate, and the rate of
unemployment. Information is derived from the national statistics of the European Commission
and the OECD. Data on the region-specific unemployment rate for Germany is provided by the
German Federal Employment Agency (for 1991 to 2011) and for the United Kingdom by the
Welsh Government (see Table A.2 in the Appendix for further information on the data sources).
To control for potential correlation between the excise tax on cigarettes and other excise taxes,
we additionally compiled yearly data on the country-specific taxation of beer per degree of
alcohol (European Commission 1990-2011a). We adjust the beer tax with the country-specific
price level to obtain the real tax (in 2005 euros).
3.2 Tobacco Control Policies in the European Union
The two main policy variables in our analysis are smoking bans and cigarette taxes as reflected
in prices. Smoking bans are public policies particularly promoted by the WHO Framework
Convention in Tobacco Control (FCTC). In response to the ratification of the treaty, many
countries introduced smoking bans in indoor workplaces, indoor public places, public transport
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and in bars and restaurants; i.e., the hospitality sector. The first country in Europe that banned
smoking comprehensively was Ireland in March 2004. In the meantime, almost all European
countries know some sort of spatial smoking restriction. While in some countries and regions
the introduction of the ban occurred on the same date, by spring 2011, there were a total of 30
different introduction dates for bans in the 40 countries and regions in our sample.
Some countries first introduced bans only in workplaces. In a second step, the bans were then
extended to the hospitality sector. This occurred in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, the
Netherlands and Slovakia. In Latvia the ban in the hospitality sector was tightened four years
after its implementation. We also take account of the fact that the comprehensiveness of the
bans differs across the countries and regions. For these particularities, we use the scores of the
Tobacco Control Scale (TCS) (Joossens and Raw 2006, 2007, 2011) to qualify the bans. The
TCS reflects the results of expert surveys regarding tobacco control activities in the European
countries. We use the sum of the sub-scale scores for smoke-free policies in workplaces (max.
ten points) and for the bans in the hospitality sector (max. eight points) and divide it by the
maximum achievable scores to build an index [0,1] that reflects the comprehensiveness of the
bans. In turn, our variable smoking banjt takes the value of the index for country/region j at
time t when a ban is introduced. For example, for Italy the variable smoking ban takes the value
zero before November, 10, 2005, and the value 0.78 afterwards (with sub-scale scores of eight
out of ten for the ban in workplaces and six out of eight for the ban in the hospitality sector).
Table A.3 in the Appendix gives an overview about the introduction dates of the countries and
regions in our sample together with the assigned scores from the TCS.
A precondition for the identification of smoking ban effects in a difference-in-differences frame-
work is that the introduction of the bans did not occur simultaneously with other (health related)
policies. An examination of the introduction processes in the countries reveals that only in Eng-
land and Wales, the implementation of the ban was part of a health act governing different
aspects of public health.8 The exclusion of these regions from the sample does not lead to
qualitatively different interpretations of the results in the empirical analysis though. However,
other tobacco control policies might still be correlated with the implementation of bans and/or
changes in cigarette taxes. Therefore we again make use of the TCS, that provides an evalua-
tion of other tobacco control measures in European countries. We use the sub-scale scores for
regulations regarding direct health warnings on cigarette packages (max. ten points), bans on
advertising and promotion (max. thirteen points), and treatments that help dependent smokers
stop smoking (max. ten points). For every country, we apply the sum of the sub-scale scores,
provided for the years 2005, 2007 and 2010, as an overall tobacco control measure to control for
the possible correlation with bans and cigarette prices.
8The examination is based on information from official documents of the European Commission and from
a project of the International Legal Consortium that is part of the campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (see
www.tobaccocontrollaws.org).
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Information on the tax structures of tobacco products and cigarette prices in European countries
is provided at least once a year in the Excise Duty Tables from the European Commission (1990-
2011b). From this data, we use the information on the overall excise tax as well as the price
of cigarettes from the most popular price category (MPPC) per 1000 cigarettes in euros.9 To
make the prices comparable across countries, we adjust them for the country-specific price levels
and report them in 2005 euros. The average real cigarette price (in 2005 euros) in the sample
is 162.1 euros per 1000 cigarettes (or 3.42 euro per package of 20 cigarettes) with a standard
deviation of 60.8. The associated average overall excise tax is 122.3 euros. In some countries,
the tax constitutes up to 90 percent of the retail price. Figure A.1 provides an overview of the
variation in the price and the overall excise tax on cigarettes across countries and over time. It
is clearly visible that taxes are the main driver of cigarette prices.
4 Empirical Analysis
In the first part, we investigate the average effects of bans and cigarette prices on the reported life
satisfaction in the population. In the second part, we study whether smokers and non-smokers
are differentially affected by the policies. In the third part, we focus on smokers who tried to
quit smoking in the recent past but relapsed. We explore how these people’s life satisfaction
is affected by the alternative tobacco policies. This sheds light on the relative effectiveness of
collective self-binding mechanisms. The fourth part considers the robustness of the results.
4.1 Overall Effects of Smoking Bans and Cigarette Prices
With reported satisfaction with life as the dependent variable, we directly assess the conse-
quences of smoking bans and cigarette prices for our proxy for individuals’ welfare. To identify
the effect of smoking bans, we exploit the staggered introduction of smoking bans across Euro-
pean countries and regions. The effect for cigarette prices is identified based on price variation
within countries over time. Specifically, we estimate regression equations of the following form:
LSijt = β0 +β1banjt +β2ln(price)jt +β3Xi +β4Zjt +β5Dj +β6Dt +β7(Dj ∗ trend) + εijt (1)
The life satisfaction LSijt of individual i in country/region j at time t is regressed on an index
variable banjt [0,1] that captures the manifestation of the policies in the specific country/region
at the time of the survey. The second policy variable is ln(price)jt for the country-specific level
of cigarette prices. As control variables, we include individual socio-demographic characteristics
Xi; i.e., age, sex, level of education, marital status, number of children in the same household,
9For France, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and the UK, no MPPC cigarette prices are reported in
2011. Accordingly, no EB observations from these countries are included in 2011.
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and the occupation of the respondent. The country-level control variables Zjt consist of the
real GDP per capita in logarithmic form, the rates of unemployment and inflation, the real
state-specific tax on beer per degree of alcohol, and the indicator of other tobacco control
measures, described in Section 3.3. In addition, we control for country-/region-specific effects
Dj , survey wave-specific time effects Dt, and country-specific time trends Dj*trend. Standard
errors are clustered at the country/region level to correct for serial and intraclass correlation
across individuals of the same country/region. We apply sample weights provided in the EB
data file throughout to reproduce the real number of cases for each country.
Table 1 presents the estimations for the overall effects of smoking bans and cigarette prices on
life satisfaction based on OLS estimates.10 Panel I shows that there is no systematic change
of life satisfaction after countries or regions have introduced or extended smoking bans, ceteris
paribus. For cigarette prices, we find a sizeable negative partial correlation with life satisfaction
in Panel II that is not statistically significant though. The estimate indicates that a fifty-percent
price increase (slightly more than one standard deviation vis-a`-vis the mean) is associated with
a decrease in the average level of satisfaction by 0.03 points on the four-point scale.
[Table 1 about here]
The separate evaluation of the two tobacco control policies might, however, be misleading if the
policies are correlated and reflect different aspects of governments’ activism in health prevention.
Panel III takes this concern into account and includes the two main policy measures together.
Further, variation in cigarette prices as well as the implementation of a ban might be correlated
with legislatitors’ and/or voters’ sentiments regarding unhealthy behavior in general. To address
this concern, we include the information on other concurrent tobacco control policies and on the
tax on beer in each country as additional control variables in Panel IV. Both, the beer tax and
other tobacco control policies, are not systematically related to subjective well-being. In Panel
V, we add control variables that capture the macro-economic conditions in a country/region,
i.e., GDP per capita, the rate of unemployment, and the rate of inflation. Smoking bans might
be easier to introduce and enforce in a boom phase than when the economic climate is harsh.11
Similarly, cigarette taxes might be less likely to be increased when economic conditions are bad
and many smokers already experience economic strain. The results indicate that the correlations
for smoking bans and cigarette prices are not driven by the state of the economy. The negative
10We apply OLS instead of ordered probit or ordered logit – which would take into account the ordinal nature
of the dependent variable – because we include interaction terms later on, which makes the interpretation and
comparison of effect sizes problematic with non-linear models (see, e.g. Ai and Norton 2003). However, the
results from ordered probit estimations are qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates. Footnote 12 reports them
for the estimation including all the control variables. Table A.4 reports the full regression outputs of the OLS
specifications in Table 1.
11Gallet et al. (2006), for example, show that the probability of a U.S. state adopting smoking restrictions
favorably depends on its per capita income.
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effect of cigarette prices remains sizeable, but is still imprecisely measured. The effect of a fifty
percent price increase in life satisfaction corresponds to an increase of the rate of unemployment
by 2.4 percentage points.12
To investigate whether the overall effects are driven by observations from a single country, we
perform a sensitivity analysis regarding the selection of samples. We repeatedly estimate the
specification of Panel V, each time excluding observations from one of the countries from the
sample.
[Figure 1 and 2 about here]
Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the estimated coefficients (and the 90% confidence in-
tervals) for the variables smoking ban and cigarette prices, respectively. A visual test reveals
that there are observations from some countries that seem to pull the coefficients in a specific
direction. If observations from the UK are left out, a negative partial correlation between smok-
ing bans and life satisfaction is estimated. In contrast, a larger positive partial correlation is
estimated if France is excluded. However, these estimates are not significantly different from
the coefficient that is estimated with the full sample. For cigarette prices a smaller negative cor-
relation is estimated if observations from Portugal and the new German Laender are excluded.
In contrast, the negative coefficient is slightly more than twice as big and becomes statistically
significant at the 10% level if observations from Spain are dropped from the sample. An ex-
planation might be that price increases in Spain started from one of the lowest price levels in
Europe and affected consumers moderately. We do not consider Spain an outlier though, and
keep the respective observations in our sample. If sensitivity checks excluding Spain are applied
to all further specifications, the direction of the results is not affected. If anything, the effects
get more pronounced and the level of statistical significance increases.
4.2 Differential Effects Depending on the Propensity to Smoke
Economic theory predicts different welfare consequences of anti-tobacco policies for smokers and
non-smokers. Differential effects can, however, not be studied based on individuals’ current
smoking status. Non-smokers in a regime with smoking bans might well be smokers if this
kind of restriction were not in place. Any observed effect for non-smokers would thus confound
consequences for previous non-smokers and people who changed their status, and lead to a
sample selection bias. Instead, we calculate for every individual in the sample the probability
that he or she smokes given his or her individual characteristics. We call this probability the
12If we estimate the specification in Panel V with an ordered probit model, we get the following coefficients for
the main variables banjt: β1=0.005 (t-value=0.16) and ln(price)jt: β2=–0.087 (t-value=–1.17). They are thus
very similar in relative size and statistical significance to the coefficients based on the OLS estimation.
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propensity to smoke. Based on this information, we test for differential effects of the policies
following the strategy of Gruber and Mullainathan (2005).
We first estimate the partial correlations for a large number of covariates of being a current
smoker. We rely on an auxiliary data set drawn from the Eurobarometer. It consists of survey
information from eight waves between 1990 and 2009. In this first step, all variables included in
specification V in Table 1 above are taken into account as covariates of smoking. We estimate the
model separately for males and females (equivalent to specifying a full interaction model). This
allows for differences in the pattern of men’s and women’s smoking behavior. Table A.5 shows
the respective results of the logistic regression models. The estimated correlations are in line
with empirically established relationships between socio-economic characteristics and smoking
behavior: high levels of education, being married, and not being unemployed are related to a
lower probability of being a smoker for men as well as for women. GDP per capita is positively
related to smoking prevalence, while for women the rate of unemployment is positively and the
rate of inflation is negatively related with the status of being a smoker. The three variables
capturing tobacco control policies are not systematically correlated with self-reported smoking
behavior.
The estimated partial correlations are then used in a second step to calculate for every individual
in the main data set a probability that he or she is a smoker based on his or her characteristics.
The imputed propensity is denoted p(smoke)i. Thereby, the propensity to smoke is calculated
for the counterfactual situation with no smoking ban in place, and cigarette prices set to the
lowest level in the time series of the respective country. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the
distribution of the imputed probabilities of being a smoker in the main data set.13
The two-step approach allows us to directly study the differential hypotheses about the welfare
consequences of smoking bans and cigarette prices for people with low and high propensities to
smoke. The regression model is extended to the following form:
LSijt = β0 + β1banjt + β2p(smoke)i + β3banjt × p(smoke)i + β4ln(price)jt+
β5ln(price)jt × p(smoke)i + β6Xi + β7Zjt + β8Dt + β9Dj + β10(Dj ∗ trend) + εijt
(2)
Technically, we include interaction terms between the variables for the tobacco control policies
13An idea of the predictive power of our specification based on within sample predictions is provided by Figure
A.3 in the Appendix. Of the people for whom we predict the lowest smoking propensities (1st quartile), 12.4
percent report that they smoke. At the other end, for people with the highest smoking propensities (4th quartile),
52.3 percent of the respondents declare that they are current smokers. We also check the goodness-of-fit from a
cross tabulation of observed and predicted outcomes. To classify whether an individual is a smoker, we define
the threshold-value for the predicted propensity to smoke in a way that produces the same number of predicted
smokers as there are actual smokers in the data set. Overall, we predict 71.1 percent of the cases correctly for
females and 64.7 percent for males. The respective probabilities that we identify correctly an actual smoker
(sensitivity) are 44.7 and 53 percent, while the fractions of correctly predicted non-smokers (specificity) are 80.4
for females and 71.8 percent for males.
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and the variable capturing the estimated propensity to smoke. The main effect for smoking
bans (or cigarette prices) then indicates the consequence of a ban (or a higher price) for people
with a predicted probability to smoke of zero. The linear combination of the main effect plus
the interaction effect indicates the consequence of a ban or a price increase for people with a
predicted probability to smoke equal to one.
Table 2 reports the results for the extended specification. Based on Panel I, there is no system-
atic difference in the effect of smoking bans on the life satisfaction of people with low and high
smoking propensities. In contrast, the effect of higher cigarette prices depends systematically
on an individual’s propensity to smoke. The life satisfaction of people with a predicted smok-
ing propensity of zero is not statistically significantly affected by changes in cigarette prices.
However, for people with a high propensity to smoke, higher cigarette prices are related to sys-
tematically lower levels of subjective well-being. Note that for the net effect of higher cigarette
prices on likely smokers, the coefficients for the main effect and for the interaction term have
to be combined. In Panel II, the linear combination of the two variables is reported. For a
propensity of one, a fifty percent price increase amounts to a reduction in life satisfaction of 0.09
points (i.e., ln(1.5)× (0.026 + -0.247)). This partial correlation holds, ceteris paribus, for an
individual’s propensity to smoke. The latter is, on average, negatively correlated with reported
satisfaction with life. As the variable for cigarette prices is mean adjusted, the coefficient of -0.27
for the propensity to smoke indicates that for average cigarette prices, people with a propensity
to smoke equal to one report, on average, a 0.27 points lower satisfaction with life than people
with a propensity equal to zero.
[Table 2 about here]
The negative effect of higher cigarette prices for people with a high propensity to smoke is
the exact opposite of the prominent previous finding in Gruber and Mullainathan (2005).14 A
possible explanation for the different results might be an omitted variable bias in the specification
used by Gruber and Mullainathan. They do not control for the prevalence of smoking bans and
other tobacco control policies that might be positively correlated with tobacco taxes.
In Panel III, we report the results of a more flexible form of the interaction between the propen-
sity to smoke and the two tobacco control policies than in Panel I where a linear relationship
is imposed. We assign each observation based on the smoke propensity in ascending order to
one of four quartiles and include interaction terms with the variables smoking ban and cigarette
prices. This allows us to estimate a separate level effect or slope coefficient for every quartile
14This also holds when we estimate the effect of cigarette prices on the probability that people report not being
at all satisfied with their life; i.e., the lowest category on the subjective well-being scale. The respective coefficient
for the main effect is 0.015 (t-value=1.34), and for the interaction effect, it is 0.014 (t-value=1.20). The linear
combination of the two coefficients that shows the net effect for likely smokers amounts to 0.028 (t-value=2.22)
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of the propensity to smoke. The results indicate that people with a higher propensity to smoke
fare better than people in the lowest quartile when a smoking ban is introduced. However,
the effects for all quartiles reported in Panel III and Panel IV are small and statistically not
significantly different from zero. For cigarette prices, the negative effect increases monotonically
with ascending propensity to smoke. For the top quartile, the linear combination results in a
statistically significant negative partial correlation of -0.091. For a fifty percent price increase,
this implies a reduction of reported satisfaction with life of 0.04 points.
In sum, the analysis for people with different propensities to smoke does not reveal statistically
significant differential effects of smoking bans. In contrast, the weak overall negative effect
of higher cigarette prices on life satisfaction of Table 1 is driven by the negative well-being
consequences for the people with the highest smoking prevalence.
4.3 Smoking Bans as a Potential Self-Control Device
Whether tobacco control policies might serve as a self-control device for smokers is difficult
to assess even with data on subjective well-being. The effect of smoking bans turned out not
to be statistically significantly positive for likely smokers in Section 4.2, and higher cigarette
prices are even sizeably negatively correlated with the life satisfaction of people in this group.
However, these results reflect average effects over all likely smokers. The prediction of a beneficial
effect of restrictions does apply to people with limited willpower though. In order to test the
predictions from behavioral economics, we analyze whether likely smokers who recently tried
but failed to quit smoking, are affected differently as a result of anti-smoking policies than
smokers who have not recently tried to stop smoking. We interpret a relapse as an indication of
limited willpower. This setting allows us to explore not only whether likely “wannabe quitters”
are affected differently, but also whether the effects differ between smoking bans and cigarette
prices, as suggested by models of cue-triggered decision making.
Information on people’s attempts to cease smoking is from EB surveys in 2006 and 2009. In these
surveys, current smokers are asked whether they tried to give up smoking within the last twelve
month. Individuals who tried to give up smoking but failed potentially suffer from self-control
problems the most. We choose a neutral term and refer to them as marginal smokers.
We categorize every individual as either being a current smoker with no recent attempt to quit,
a non-smoker or a marginal smoker. In our data, about 30 percent of all the smokers are such
marginal smokers. We again apply a two-step approach to impute propensities for being a non-
smoker, a current smoker or a marginal smoker in our main dataset. In a first step, we estimate
a multinomial logit model that we use in a second step to predict the respective propensities.15
15The estimation results of the multinomial logit model are reported in Table A.6. Figure A.4 in the Appendix
shows the distribution of the predicted propensities to be a non-smoker, a smoker or a marginal smoker.
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Every individual has probability values for all the three possible statuses that sum up to one.
Their propensities thus show the relative likelihood of being either a non-smoker, a smoker or
a marginal smoker. Again we use these propensities to estimate differential effects of smoking
bans and cigarette prices on people’s life satisfaction.
Table 3 presents the results. Panel I shows the estimated coefficients for simple interaction
terms of the tobacco control policies with the particular propensities, and Panel II reports the
respective marginal effects and values for the linear combinations. The estimated effects suggest,
first, that smoking bans do not affect non-smokers, reduce the life satisfaction of people who are
likely smokers (and who have not recently tried to cease smoking), but substantially increase
the life satisfaction of marginal smokers, and, second, that higher cigarette prices do also not
affect non-smokers but reduce the life satisfaction of likely smokers, and particularly of marginal
smokers. However, this interpretation has to be treated with caution as the marginal effects and
the values for the linear combinations refer to out of sample predictions, i.e., they indicate the
effect for a propensity of one for a particular status, while being zero for the other two statuses.
These combinations do not occur in the data.
[Table 3 about here]
In order to attain meaningful values for the policy effects on subjective well-being, we define sep-
arate groups of people who are characterized by large propensities in one of the three dimensions.
This approach also overcomes the linearity assumption in specifications with simple interaction
terms. For the specification in Panel III, we determine the people who are in the top quartile
with regard to their propensity to smoke, to be a marginal smoker and to be a non-smoker.
As we try to identify those people in each country who are most likely to suffer from reduced
willpower when it comes to smoking, we build the quartiles separately for every country. The
remaining individuals are in the category others. As there is a partial overlap between the top
quartiles of smokers and marginal smokers, the respective individuals are assigned a separate
group (q4(smoker + marginal)). Based on this grouping, interaction terms with the tobacco
control policies are included in the estimation, whereby the top quartile of non-smokers is left
out and forms the reference group.
The estimation results in Panel III and the reported marginal effects and values for the linear
combinations in Panel IV reveal systematic differences in how the groups are affected by smoking
bans and cigarette prices. For people in the reference group (i.e., likely non-smokers) a negative
correlation between the introduction of a smoking ban and subjective well-being is measured.
The life satisfaction of likely smokers (who have not recently tried to cease smoking) is not
correlated with the introduction of a smoking ban. There is, however, a significant difference
for smokers who have recently tried to give up smoking. The introduction of a smoking ban is
related to a statistically significant 0.08 points increase in their reported satisfaction with life.
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Differential effects are also observed for cigarette prices. While smokers as well as marginal
smokers are similarly negatively affected by higher cigarette prices, the largest negative effect
that is also most precisely estimated is found for people who simultaneously belong to the
top quartiles of the propensity to be smoker and marginal smoker. For likely non-smokers,
higher cigarette prices are not correlated with their life satisfaction. These results suggest that
the negative effect of higher prices on smokers’ well-being also holds for smokers with limited
willpower, while this latter group is positively affected by smoking bans.
4.4 Robustness Analysis
Before we further interpret the findings, we investigate the robustness of the results reported in
Table 3. In particular, we address the possibility that the heterogeneity in the effects of tobacco
policies on people with different smoking statuses picks up differential trends in these people’s
well-being. There is, however, no simple test to exclude this alternative explanation, as there
might well be substantive lead effects to smoking bans. People might react once the bans are
announced. But more importantly, any mandated smoking restriction might be implemented in
firms ahead of time.
To approach the issue, we first include lead terms for the particular top quartiles that are equal
to the smoking ban variable for the year before the introduction of the ban and zero otherwise.
We present the result of this strategy in Table 4. Panel I and Panel II with the respective
marginal effects and linear combinations show that particularly likely non-smokers, who again
form the reference group, have a lower satisfaction level already in the year before the bans are
introduced. This indicates either that there exist substantial lead effects for non-smokers and
partly also for likely smokers or that the negative main effect reflects some underlying group-
specific trend. Relative to non-smokers, marginal smokers, however, experience an increase in
subjective well-being with smoking bans. The respective marginal effect is 0.075 (t-value=2.59),
while it amounts to 0.024 (t-value=0.83) during the lead phase.
[Table 4 about here]
Second, to control for potential underlying group-specific trends, we allow for a flexible devel-
opment of life satisfaction over time for the differentiated groups by including country-specific
time trends for all of them. The results of this flexible specification in the Panels III and IV
suggest that the negative effect of smoking bans for non-smokers and likely smokers in Panel
II is a statistical artifact. In contrast, the size of the well-being gain of marginal smokers re-
mains considerable. The interaction term which captures the increase in the life satisfaction of
marginal smokers relative to non-smokers amounts to 0.052 (t-value=1.31); the linear combina-
tion reflecting the absolute increase relative to the reference period (more than one year before
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the introduction of a smoking ban) is 0.039 (t-value=0.94); and the effect size relative to the life
satisfaction of marginal smokers during the lead phase is estimated to be 0.061 (t-value=1.96).
The latter effect is even bigger than the respective difference according to Panel II. The differ-
ential results for cigarette prices across people of alternative smoking statuses remain similar to
the results in Table 3.
In Table 5 we pursue three additional strategies to address the potential influence of underlying
trends. First, we capture short-term effects by restricting the sample to observations within a
fixed time window around the country specific implementation date of the ban. Panel I shows a
specification where we use only those observations in a country or region that are surveyed within
three years before or after the implementation and Panel II presents the respective marginal
effects and linear combinations. Comparable to the results in Table 4, we observe a net effect
for marginal smokers of 0.045 (t-value=1.67) when a ban is introduced. For the reduced sample,
effects similar to Tables 3 and 4 are also estimated for cigarette prices.16
[Table 5 about here]
Second, any underlying trend for the different groups might also be driven by differential expo-
sure to macro-economic conditions. The specifications in Panels III and IV take this concern
into account. For every group different partial correlations with the macro-economic variables as
well as the other tobacco control policies and the beer taxes are considered by including interac-
tion terms. Again a positive differential effect for marginal smokers is estimated. The respective
interaction term is 0.112 (t-value= 4.25), amounting to a total effect of 0.078 (t-value=3.18).
Third, in our most flexible specification, we allow a specific level-effect for observations from any
country/region in a particular survey wave, i.e., we include country/region x wave specific fixed
effects. The focus is thus on the change in the difference between smokers or marginal smokers
vis-a`-vis non-smokers when smoking bans are introduced. This is the same triple difference
reported as marginal effects before. Due to the flexible specification, however, the main effect
for the variable smoking ban can no longer be identified. This exercise produces a marginal
effect of the ban for marginal smokers of 0.105 (t-value=3.92), i.e., any difference between
marginal smokers and non-smokers increases in favor of the marginal smokers by 0.105 units
on the four point life satisfaction scale if a smoking ban is introduced. As for the previous
robustness checks, the differential effects for cigarette prices across groups remain very similar
to the baseline findings in Table 3.
In sum, we interpret the results as evidence that smoking bans can serve as a self-control device
for individuals with limited willpower, while cigarette prices seem not useful for this purpose. In
16When we vary the range of included observations between one and ten years before and after the ban, the
biggest net effect for marginal smokers amounts to 0.080 (t-value=2.45, one year before and after the ban), while
the smallest effect is 0.028 (t-value=0.98, five years before and after the ban).
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turn, this supports models building on cue-triggered decision-making processes, as they predict
that smoking bans, but not cigarette taxes, help to reduce overconsumption for given levels of
addiction.
5 Conclusions
The public health debate on tobacco consumption is highly controversial. Some policy briefs are
oriented towards solving an intervention problem to reduce smoking no matter what the cost.
Other voices see recent developments in anti-smoking policy as modern witch-hunts and plea
for the freedom of consumers. Inherently, it is difficult to assess whether someone who smokes
less or gives up smoking because of some policy intervention is made better or worse off. Recent
developments in the economic analysis of people’s subjective well-being offer new opportunities
to explore the effects of policies on people’s welfare.
We assess the welfare consequences of tobacco control policies by analyzing information on
individuals’ satisfaction with life for more than half a million people in Europe. Thereby, we
concentrate on the introduction of smoking bans in the workplace and in the hospitality sector
as well as on differences in cigarette prices that reflect variation in tobacco excise taxes to a
large extent. We investigate 40 interventions that were implemented across European countries
and regions, and apply an empirical strategy that concentrates on the variation of reported life
satisfaction around a country-specific time trend to identify potential policy effects.
Based on policy implementations spanning the last twenty years in Europe, we find that smoking
bans, on average, neither increase nor decrease people’s subjective well-being to a sizable and
statistically significant degree. Higher cigarette prices are related to overall lower reported
levels of satisfaction with life, ceteris paribus. The partial correlation is, however, measured
with a large standard error. Still, the effect is economically meaningful (and corroborated by
our differential analysis for people with different smoking propensities). For a fifty percent price
increase, we estimate a reduction in average life satisfaction of 0.02 points (on a four point scale).
This is about one tenth of the effect of being unemployed rather than employed or equivalent
to the effect of a 2.4 percentage points higher rate of unemployment on the population at large.
This finding does not lend support to the effectiveness of cigarette taxes as an internalization
strategy. Higher cigarette prices at least have overall negative short-term effects. When assessing
the attractiveness of excise taxes as instruments of welfare policy, these short-term costs should
be taken into account and balanced against any potential long-term effects that positively affect
average subjective well-being. The traditional argument is that due to the price elasticity of
smoking and the social multipliers involved in smoking behavior (see, e.g., Christakis and Fowler,
2008), people smoke less with higher taxes, which in turn lead to a generally healthier population
in the long-run.
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We further find that the negative effects of higher cigarette prices are concentrated on smokers.
Non-smokers neither benefit nor suffer in terms of subjective well-being. This finding highlights
the distributional consequences of tobacco taxation, as smoking is much more prevalent in poorer
socio-economic groups. Tobacco taxation thus has a regressive component. In fact, the large
negative effects of higher prices might well reflect income effects to some extent. For example,
in our sample, the average real price per package of cigarettes in the most popular price class
amounts to 3.45 euros in 2005, whereof total taxes are 75 percent. In comparison, in 2005 the
average legal real minimum wage per hour is about five euros in the same set of countries. For
low income households, consumption expenditure on cigarettes therefore potentially erodes a
substantial part of their budget.
Additionally, smoking bans turn out to be beneficial to smokers who would like to stop smoking
(or not start again). For those smokers who are most likely to find themselves in a situation
where they have recently tried to give up smoking but have relapsed, life satisfaction increases
between 0.03 to 0.08 points with smoking bans (depending on the specification). This is evidence
that supports the idea that smoking bans can serve as a self-control device. Interestingly, the
same group of people does not benefit from higher cigarette prices. Rather to the contrary,
these people seem to suffer to the same extend as other smokers do who have not recently tried
to stop in response to higher prices. The negative effect of higher cigarette prices on smokers,
particularly those who are likely to have self-control problems, runs counter to the prominent
finding by Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) for the United States where positive effects of higher
cigarette taxes on the well-being of smokers are identified.
The differential effects of alternative tobacco control policies on people who are likely to suffer
from limited willpower lend some smoking gun evidence in support of behavioral economic
models of cue-triggered decision-making (Bernheim and Rangel 2004). These models emphasize
the importance of situational cues and temptations and the limited effectiveness of prices as a
self-control device when consumers are in a “hot” state.
We advocate the emerging research that integrates the analysis of peoples reported subjective
well-being in policy evaluation. This is particularly important with regard to policies that aim
to internalize social costs or to help people make better decisions, what often is denoted as
paternalistic. Complementary insights are possible when studying direct measures of individual
welfare.
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Table 1: Smoking bans, cigarette prices and life satisfaction in 40 European countries and
regions, 1990-2011
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV V
Smoking ban 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.37) (0.07) (0.25) (0.12)
ln(cigarette price) {0.083 {0.082 {0.069 {0.054
({1.38) ({1.37) ({1.32) ({1.19)
Other tobacco policies {0.000 0.002
({0.02) (0.31)
ln(beer tax) {0.025 {0.008
({0.71) ({0.20)
ln(GDP per capita) {0.043
({0.19)
Unemployment rate {0.009*
({1.79)
Ination rate {0.001
({0.32)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country/region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-spec. time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40 40
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the
country/region level.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Figure 1: Average eects of smoking bans on life satisfaction: sensitivity to the exclusion of
single countries
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Notes: Based on repeated estimations of specication V in Table 1. GEW and GEE stand for
Germany West and Germany East, respectively. The order of the labeled countries corresponds
to the sequence of the introduction of smoking bans.
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Figure 2: Average eects of cigarette prices on life satisfaction: sensitivity to the exclusion of
single countries
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Notes: Based on repeated estimations of specication V in Table 1. GEW and GEE stand for
Germany West and Germany East, respectively. The order of the labeled countries corresponds
to the sequence of the introduction of smoking bans.
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Table 2: Dierential eects with regard to individuals' propensity to smoke
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV
ME/LCa ME/LCa
Smoking ban {0.012 {0.012 {0.015 {0.015
({0.46) ({0.46) ({0.65) ({0.65)
Ban x p(smoker) 0.040 0.029
(0.65) (0.60)
q2(smoker) x ban 0.015 0.001
(1.01) (0.03)
q3(smoker) x ban 0.029 0.014
(1.56) (0.72)
q4(smoker) x ban 0.018 0.004
(0.73) (0.15)
ln(cigarette prices) 0.026 0.026 0.012 0.012
(0.70) (0.70) (0.31) (0.31)
Price x p(smoker) {0.247*** {0.221**
({3.44) ({2.62)
q2(smoker) x price {0.051** {0.039
({2.66) ({0.89)
q3(smoker) x price {0.095*** {0.083
({3.21) ({1.55)
q4(smoker) x price {0.103*** {0.091*
({3.52) ({1.76)
p(smoker) {0.265*** {0.265***
({4.65) ({4.65)
q2(smoker) {0.010 {0.010
({1.15) ({1.15)
q3(smoker) {0.033*** {0.033***
({2.98) ({2.98)
q4(smoker) {0.070*** {0.070***
({5.45) ({5.45)
No. of observations 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the
country/region level. All regressions control for individual characteristics, macroeconomic
variables, other tobacco control measures, beer tax, country/region and survey wave xed
eects and country-specic time trends. ln(cigarette price) is mean adjusted.
a) Marginal eects (ME) for main eects. Linear combinations (LC) of main (policy) eect
with interaction eects of interaction terms.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Table 3: Dierential eects on smokers who want to quit smoking (marginal smokers)
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV
ME/LCa ME/LCa
Smoking banb {0.003 {0.003 {0.035 {0.035
({0.12) ({0.12) ({1.57) ({1.57)
Ban x p(smokerc) {0.241*** {0.244***
({3.40) ({3.64)
Ban x p(marginal smokerc) 0.548*** 0.546***
(3.53) (3.78)
q4(smoker) x ban 0.044* 0.009
(1.89) (0.43)
q4(marginal smoker) x ban 0.115*** 0.080***
(4.41) (2.91)
q4(smoker + marginal) x ban 0.040 0.005
(1.57) (0.22)
other x ban 0.044*** 0.009
(2.93) (0.48)
ln(cigarette prices) 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.022
(0.36) (0.36) (0.60) (0.60)
Price x p(smoker) {0.109 {0.094
({1.35) ({1.35)
Price x p(marginal smoker) {0.375** {0.360**
({2.20) ({1.86)
q4(smoker) x price {0.097*** {0.075*
({4.35) ({1.82)
q4(marginal smoker) x price {0.097** {0.076
({2.18) ({1.16)
q4(smoker + marginal) x price {0.126*** {0.105**
({4.69) ({2.24)
other x price {0.078*** {0.057
({3.16) ({1.17)
No. of observations 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the country/region level. All regressions
control for individual characteristics, macroeconomic variables, other tobacco control measures, beer tax, country/region
and survey wave xed eects and country-specic time trends. ln(cigarette price) is mean adjusted. All specications also
include the main eects for smokers, non-smokers and marginal smokers.
a) Marginal eects (ME) for main eects. Linear combinations (LC) of main (policy) eect with interaction eects of
interaction terms.
b) The reference category refers to people with a high propensity to be non-smokers (top quartile).
c) Propensity to be a smoker is for smokers who have not tried to quit smoking, while the propensity to be a marginal
smoker refers to smokers who tried to stop smoking.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
31
Table 4: Dierential eects on marginal smokers: robustness checks for lead eects and group-
specic time trends
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV
ME/LCa ME/LCa
Smoking banb {0.045* {0.045* {0.013 {0.013
({1.81) ({1.81) ({0.60) ({0.60)
q4(smokerc) x ban 0.045* 0.000 0.001 {0.012
(1.90) (0.02) (0.03) ({0.40)
q4(marginal smokerc) x ban 0.120*** 0.075** 0.052 0.039
(4.48) (2.59) (1.31) (0.94)
q4(smoker + marginal) x ban 0.044 {0.001 0.016 0.003
(1.60) ({0.05) (0.89) (0.12)
Other x ban 0.050*** 0.005 0.003 {0.010
(3.20) (0.23) (0.15) ({0.53)
Lead ban {0.047** {0.047** {0.022 {0.022
({2.64) ({2.64) ({1.46) ({1.46)
Lead q4(smoker) x ban 0.017 {0.030* {0.000 {0.022
(0.78) ({1.85) ({0.01) ({1.29)
Lead q4(marginal smoker) 0.071** 0.024 0.001 {0.021
x ban (2.07) (0.83) (0.02) ({0.79)
Lead q4(smoker + marginal) 0.038 {0.009 0.008 {0.014
x ban (1.39) ({0.41) (0.33) ({0.59)
Lead other x ban 0.057*** 0.011 0.021 {0.001
(3.70) (0.64) (1.52) ({0.06)
ln(cigarette prices) 0.020 0.020 {0.020 {0.020
(0.55) (0.55) ({0.62) ({0.62)
q4(smoker) x price {0.098*** {0.077* {0.037 {0.057
({4.38) ({1.84) ({1.27) ({1.32)
q4(marginal smoker) x price {0.099** {0.079 {0.045 {0.065
({2.23) ({1.20) ({1.07) ({1.12)
q4(smoker + marginal) x price {0.128*** {0.107** {0.113*** {0.133**
({4.69) ({2.28) ({2.81) ({2.30)
Other x price {0.080*** {0.060 {0.033 {0.053
({3.26) ({1.23) ({1.05) ({1.03)
q4(smoking statuses)
x country-spec. time trends No No Yes Yes
No. of observations 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the country/region level. All regressions
control for individual characteristics, macroeconomic variables, other tobacco control measures, beer tax, country/region
and survey wave xed eects and country-specic time trends. ln(cigarette price) is mean adjusted. All specications also
include the main eects for smokers, non-smokers and marginal smokers.
a) Marginal eects (ME) for main eects. Linear combinations (LC) of main (policy) eect with interaction eects of
interaction terms.
b) The reference category refers to people with a high propensity to be non-smokers (top quartile).
c) Propensity to be a smoker is for smokers who have not tried to quit smoking, while the propensity to be a marginal
smoker refers to smokers who tried to stop smoking.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Table 5: Dierential eects on marginal smokers: further robustness checks
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV V
ME/LCa ME/LCa
Smoking banb 0.026 0.026 {0.034 {0.034
(1.11) (1.11) ({1.55) ({1.55)
q4(smokerc) x ban 0.009 0.035 0.044** 0.010 0.037
(0.28) (1.18) (2.08) (0.51) (1.59)
q4(marginal smokerc) x ban 0.019 0.045 0.112*** 0.078*** 0.105***
(0.55) (1.67) (4.25) (3.18) (3.92)
q4(smoker + marginal) x ban {0.020 0.007 0.044* 0.010 0.034
({0.64) (0.25) (1.70) (0.40) (1.32)
Other x ban {0.014 {0.012 0.042*** 0.008 0.041***
({0.72) ({0.66) (2.75) (0.46) (2.80)
ln(cigarette prices) 0.018 0.018 {0.009 {0.009
(0.36) (0.36) ({0.21) ({0.21)
q4(smoker) x price {0.092** {0.074 {0.049* {0.059 {0.087***
({2.69) ({1.55) ({1.91) ({0.29) ({3.69)
q4(marginal smoker) x price {0.159*** {0.141*** {0.051 {0.060 {0.114**
({7.17) ({3.04) ({1.48) ({1.09) ({2.34)
q4(smoker + marginal) x price {0.115*** {0.097** {0.110*** {0.119** {0.117***
({4.11) ({2.59) ({3.11) ({2.70) ({4.42)
Other x price {0.093*** {0.075* {0.038 {0.047 {0.072***
({4.91) ({1.80) ({1.48) ({0.94) ({2.82)
Sample reduced to 3 years
before & after ban intro Yes Yes No No No
q4(smoking statuses)
x macroeconomic variables No No Yes Yes No
Fixed eects:
country/region x survey wave No No No No Yes
No. of observations 271,188 271,188 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40 40
R2 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the country/region level. All regressions
control for individual characteristics, macroeconomic variables, other tobacco control measures and for the beer tax.
ln(cigarette price) is mean adjusted. All specications also include the main eects for smokers, non-smokers and marginal
smokers.
a) Marginal eects (ME) for main eects. Linear combinations (LC) of main (policy) eect with interaction eects of
interaction terms.
b) The reference category refers to people with a high propensity to be non-smokers (top quartile).
c) Propensity to be a smoker is for smokers who have not tried to quit smoking, while the propensity to be a marginal
smoker refers to smokers who tried to stop smoking.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Figure A.1: Real cigarette prices and real cigarette taxes (in 2005 Euros) per 1000 cigarettes
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Source: Own calculations based on the Excise Duty Tables provided by the European Commis-
sion (1990-2011a) and on the country-specic price level (source: see Table A.2)
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Figure A.2: Distribution of predicted propensities to smoke
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Note: Distribution is for the sample of people studied in Table 2.
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Figure A.3: Actual smoking behavior for people with dierent smoking propensities
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Note: Mean values per quartile are based on within sample predictions of 126,264 observations.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of predicted propensities to be non-smoker, smoker and marginal
smoker
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Note: Distributions are for the sample of people studied in Table 3.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Individual level
Life satisfaction 3.048 0.742 1.000 4.000
Age 45.892 18.218 15.000 99.000
Female 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000
Education up to age 17 0.252 0.434 0.000 1.000
Education up to age 18-21 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000
Education up to age 22 and more 0.262 0.440 0.000 1.000
Student 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000
No fulltime education 0.003 0.055 0.000 1.000
Married 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000
Single with partner 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000
Single 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000
Divorced 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000
Widowed 0.090 0.287 0.000 1.000
Other 0.009 0.095 0.000 1.000
No child in HH under age 15 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000
One child in HH under age 15 0.131 0.337 0.000 1.000
Two children in HH under age 15 0.093 0.290 0.000 1.000
Three children in HH under age 15 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000
Four children in HH under age 15 0.009 0.094 0.000 1.000
No info about children in HH 0.137 0.344 0.000 1.000
Working 0.497 0.500 0.000 1.000
Unemployed 0.064 0.244 0.000 1.000
Out of labour force 0.439 0.496 0.000 1.000
Country level
Smoking ban 0.200 0.311 0.000 1.000
Cigarette prices 162.123 60.843 36.700 366.919
ln(cigarette prices) 5.018 0.384 3.603 5.905
Beer tax 3.051 2.934 0.279 14.784
ln(beer tax) 0.732 0.859 {1.276 2.694
Other tobacco policies 20.678 4.996 8.000 27.000
GDP per capita 23670.544 7241.468 7787.305 65864.922
ln(GDP per capita) 10.028 0.303 8.960 11.095
Unemployment rate 8.200 3.827 1.600 21.600
Ination rate 2.880 2.247 {1.700 15.300
No. of observations 629,930
Data Sources: Individual-level data is from Eurobarometer Survey Series. HH stands for
household. For country level data see Table A.2.
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Table A.2: Data sources
Individual level data from Eurobarometer
Cumulated data from the Mannheim Trend File are extended by individual survey waves up to
2011 and variables are coded accordingly. Additional surveys included: 60.1; 62.0; 62.2; 63.4;
64.2; 65.2; 66.1; 67.2; 68.1; 69.2; 70.1; 71.1; 71.2; 71.3; 73.4; 74.2; 75.3.
Smoking behavior
- Surveys: 34.1; 38.0; 41.0; 43.0; 58.2; 64.1; 66.2; 72.3.
- Question and answers: Which of the following applies to yourself? 1. You smoke manu-
factured cigarettes; 2. You smoke roll-your-own cigarettes; 3. You smoke cigars or a pipe;
4. You used to smoke but you have stopped; 5. You have never smoked.
Attempts to quit smoking
- Surveys: 66.2; 72.3.
- Question and answers: Have you tried to give up smoking in the last 12 months (only
current smokers)? 1. Yes, once; 2. Yes, between 2 and 5 times; 3. Yes, more than 5 times;
4. No.
Country level data
Gross domestic product
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data le nama aux gph)
- World Bank: data.worldbank.org (for Ireland and Portugal)
Unemployment rate
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data le une rt a)
- German Federal Employment Agency: statistik.arbeitsagentur.de (for German Laender)
- Welsh Government: statswales.wales.gov.uk (for UK regions)
Ination rate
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data le prc hicp aind)
- OECD: stats.oecd.org (for 1990 and Sweden)
- European Central Bank: sdw.ecb.europa.eu (for EU-27)
Price level index
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data le prc ppp indn)
- OECD: stats.oecd.org (for 1990-1994)
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Table A.3: Introduction dates of public smoking bans in 40 European countries and regions
Workplace ban Hospitality sector ban
Introduction Scope Introduction Scope
Country date [1-10] date [1-8]
Austria 01.01.09 2 01.07.10 2
Belgium 01.01.06 6 01.01.07 4
Cyprus (Republic of) 01.01.10 2 01.01.10 6
Denmark 15.08.07 4 15.08.07 4
Estonia 04.06.05 4 05.06.07 6
Finland 01.06.07 8 01.06.07 6
France 01.02.07 8 01.01.08 6
Germanya (East):
Berlin 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Brandenburg 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Saxony 01.02.08 4 01.02.08 4
Saxony-Anhalt 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Thuringia 01.07.08 4 01.07.08 4
Germany (West):
Baden-Wurttemberg 01.08.07 4 01.08.07 4
Bavaria 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Bremen 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Hamburg 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Hesse 01.10.07 4 01.10.07 4
Lower Saxony 01.08.07 4 01.08.07 4
North Rhine-Westphalia 01.07.08 4 01.07.08 4
Rhineland-Palatinate 15.02.08 4 15.02.08 4
Saarland 01.02.08 4 01.02.08 4
Schleswig-Holstein 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Ireland 29.03.04 10 29.03.04 8
Italy 10.01.05 8 10.01.05 6
Latvia 01.07.06 4 01.07.06 4
01.10.10 8b
Lithuania 01.01.07 4 01.01.07 6
Luxembourg 05.09.06 4 05.09.06 4
Malta 01.04.05 8 01.04.05 6
Netherlands 01.01.04 6 01.07.08 4
Portugal 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Romania 01.01.09 2 01.01.09 2
Slovakia 01.04.09 4 01.09.09 4
Slovenia 01.08.07 6 01.08.07 6
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.3: (continued)
Spain 01.01.06 10 01.01.06 2
Sweden 01.06.05 6 01.06.05 6
United Kingdom:
Wales 02.04.07 10 02.04.07 8
Scotland 01.03.06 10 01.03.06 8
England 01.07.07 10 01.07.07 8
Northern Ireland 30.04.07 10 30.04.07 8
Notes: a) According to Joossens and Raw (2007, 2011) tobacco control in workplaces in Germany
became more restrictive between 2007 and 2010; i.e., the index of the Tobacco Control Scale
increased from 2 to 4. As there is no change in the federal law, we assume that the change
occured parallel to the implementation of bans in the hospitality sector.
b) In Latvia the ban in the hospitality sector was tightened on May 1st, 2010.
Sources: European countries and regions in the UK: European Commission (2010), European
Network for Smoking Prevention (2010); German Laender: Aufmuth (2010), Kvasnicka (2010);
Tobacco Control Scale: Joossens and Raw (2006, 2007, 2011).
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Table A.4: Smoking bans, cigarette prices and life satisfaction in 40 European countries and
regions, 1990-2011: full regression outputs
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction
I II III IV V
Smoking ban 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.37) (0.07) (0.25) (0.12)
ln(cigarette price) {0.083 {0.082 {0.069 {0.054
({1.38) ({1.37) ({1.32) ({1.19)
Other tobacco policies {0.000 0.002
({0.02) (0.31)
ln(beer tax) {0.025 {0.008
({0.71) ({0.20)
ln(GDP per capita) {0.043
({0.19)
Unemployment rate {0.009*
({1.79)
Ination rate {0.001
({0.32)
Age {0.021*** {0.021*** {0.021*** {0.021*** {0.021***
({13.16) ({13.16) ({13.16) ({13.14) ({13.12)
Age2/100 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(14.31) (14.32) (14.32) (14.30) (14.28)
Female 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(3.21) (3.22) (3.22) (3.22) (3.21)
Education until less Reference
than age 15 category
Education until age 15 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(2.77) (2.77) (2.77) (2.76) (2.76)
Education until age 16 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(4.65) (4.64) (4.64) (4.64) (4.62)
Education until age 17 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.065***
(5.78) (5.77) (5.77) (5.78) (5.82)
Education until age 18 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093***
(7.58) (7.57) (7.57) (7.57) (7.63)
Education until age 19 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.116***
(11.29) (11.27) (11.28) (11.27) (11.39)
Education until age 20 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127***
(13.64) (13.61) (13.63) (13.62) (13.74)
Education until age 21 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.145***
(14.90) (14.88) (14.89) (14.88) (14.94)
Education until age 22+ 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156***
(14.56) (14.55) (14.57) (14.56) (14.57)
Student 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221***
(14.62) (14.60) (14.65) (14.65) (14.74)
No fulltime education {0.099*** {0.100*** {0.100*** {0.100*** {0.100***
({2.98) ({2.98) ({2.98) ({2.97) ({2.97)
Married Reference
category
Single with partner {0.084*** {0.084*** {0.084*** {0.084*** {0.084***
({17.67) ({17.73) ({17.72) ({17.78) ({17.54)
Single {0.154*** {0.155*** {0.155*** {0.154*** {0.154***
({13.04) ({13.05) ({13.05) ({13.01) ({12.98)
Divorced {0.275*** {0.275*** {0.275*** {0.275*** {0.275***
({22.70) ({22.77) ({22.77) ({22.75) ({22.78)
Widowed {0.208*** {0.208*** {0.208*** {0.208*** {0.208***
({17.96) ({17.99) ({18.01) ({17.97) ({17.88)
Other marital status {0.105*** {0.104*** {0.104*** {0.104*** {0.106***
({3.98) ({3.96) ({3.95) ({3.95) ({4.00)
No children in HH Reference
under age 15 category
One child in HH {0.012*** {0.012*** {0.012*** {0.012*** {0.012**
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.4: (continued)
under age 15 ({2.73) ({2.74) ({2.74) ({2.73) ({2.61)
Two children in HH {0.008 {0.008 {0.008 {0.008 {0.008
under age 15 ({1.38) ({1.38) ({1.38) ({1.39) ({1.32)
Three children in HH {0.019* {0.019* {0.019* {0.019* {0.018*
under age 15 ({1.97) ({1.99) ({1.99) ({2.00) ({1.91)
Four or more children in HH {0.041** {0.041** {0.041** {0.041** {0.040**
under age 15 ({2.51) ({2.52) ({2.52) ({2.52) ({2.43)
No info about children in HH 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
Manual worker Reference
category
Unemployed {0.307*** {0.307*** {0.307*** {0.307*** {0.304***
({21.37) ({21.43) ({21.44) ({21.51) ({21.13)
Without occupation 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026** 0.026**
(2.23) (2.23) (2.23) (2.23) (2.23)
Retired 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.44)
Farmer/sherman 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49)
Professional 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178***
(10.28) (10.31) (10.30) (10.27) (10.31)
Self-employed 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(3.92) (3.91) (3.91) (3.92) (3.93)
Business propriator 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153***
(8.98) (8.96) (8.95) (8.91) (8.93)
Emloyed professional 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.160***
(11.95) (11.92) (11.92) (11.95) (12.04)
General management 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216***
(12.57) (12.51) (12.51) (12.53) (12.55)
Middle management 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142***
(12.74) (12.66) (12.66) (12.59) (12.58)
Employed position (desk) 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***
(8.18) (8.14) (8.14) (8.15) (8.16)
Employed position (travel) 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(6.25) (6.22) (6.23) (6.23) (6.22)
Service sector 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(10.80) (10.79) (10.78) (10.85) (10.87)
Supervisor 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(5.45) (5.45) (5.45) (5.46) (5.47)
No. of observations 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930 629,930
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40 40
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Notes: OLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the country/region level. All regressions
control for country/region and survey wave xed eects and country-specic time trends.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Table A.5: Covariates of individual smoking behavior in 40 European countries and regions,
1990-2009
Dependent variable: smoking (=1)
Male Female
Smoking ban 0.091 {0.067
(1.56) ({1.42)
ln(cigarette price) 0.168 0.004
(1.27) (0.04)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.500** 0.720***
(2.25) (2.63)
Unemployment rate 0.010 0.028***
(1.33) (2.85)
Ination rate 0.005 {0.029**
(0.49) ({2.48)
Other tobacco policies 0.008 {0.021***
(0.74) ({2.70)
ln(beer tax) {0.151** {0.140**
({2.46) ({2.12)
Age 0.117*** 0.089***
(9.09) (4.51)
Age2/100 {0.222*** {0.191***
({8.14) ({3.96)
Age3/1000 0.010*** 0.007**
(5.45) (2.13)
Education until less than age 15 Reference
category
Education up to age 16-19 {0.072 0.102
({1.25) (1.00)
Education up to age 20 or more {0.402*** {0.304**
({5.89) ({2.27)
Student {0.745*** {0.694***
({4.48) ({4.25)
Married Reference
category
Single with partner 0.253*** 0.318***
(5.90) (6.58)
Single 0.187*** 0.411***
(6.17) (10.73)
Divorced 0.742*** 0.852***
(14.90) (19.64)
Widowed 0.427*** 0.378***
(7.52) (8.41)
Other marital status 0.229** 0.246***
(2.57) (3.23)
No children in HH under age 15 Reference
category
One child in HH under age 15 {0.081** {0.035
({2.22) ({1.15)
Two children child in HH under age 15 {0.125*** {0.177***
({3.04) ({4.36)
Three children in HH under age 15 {0.173** {0.153***
({2.45) ({2.83)
Four children in HH under age 15 0.034 0.001
(0.69) (0.02)
No info about children in HH 0.190*** 0.231***
(6.09) (6.34)
Manual worker Reference
category
Unemployed 0.376*** 0.137***
(7.19) (2.97)
Without occupation {0.252* {0.165***
({1.84) ({3.43)
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.5: (continued)
Retired {0.156*** {0.021
({2.80) ({0.22)
Farmer/sherman {0.663*** {1.020***
({7.31) ({5.55)
Professional {0.326*** {0.171
({4.31) ({1.17)
Self-employed {0.176*** {0.038
({2.62) ({0.58)
Business propriator {0.327*** {0.057
({5.24) ({0.53)
Emloyed professional {0.536*** {0.499***
({5.84) ({5.92)
General management {0.500*** {0.273***
({6.26) ({2.84)
Middle management {0.521*** {0.445***
({9.28) ({7.35)
Employed position (desk) {0.533*** {0.336***
({8.24) ({5.34)
Employed position (travel) {0.156*** 0.008
({2.73) (0.12)
Service sector {0.241*** {0.158***
({4.65) ({2.82)
Supervisor {0.252*** {0.287*
({2.80) ({1.80)
No. of obs. 57,774 68,490
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07
Notes: Logit estimations. Z-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on the country/region level. Country
xed eects and country-specic time trends are included in the regression.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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Table A.6: Covariates in the multinomial logit model for smokers, non-smokers and marginal
smokers
Reference category: Non-smoker (=1)
Male Female
Marginal Marginal
Smoker smoker Smoker smoker
Smoking ban 0.061 {0.080 {0.188** {0.364**
(0.35) ({0.46) ({2.00) ({2.56)
ln(cigarette price) {0.394*** {0.165 {0.236** {0.017
({3.08) ({0.80) ({2.12) ({0.10)
ln(GDP per capita) 1.580 0.074 0.002 0.336
(1.59) (0.07) (0.00) (0.38)
Unemployment rate {0.017 0.042** 0.000 0.056***
({0.87) (2.32) (0.02) (3.27)
Ination rate {0.083** 0.112** {0.039 0.029
({2.08) (2.30) ({1.08) (0.80)
Other tobacco policies {0.013 0.028 {0.033*** {0.025*
({1.54) (1.40) ({3.02) ({1.77)
ln(beer tax) {0.090 {0.786 {0.805** {0.464
({0.20) ({0.79) ({2.22) ({0.60)
Age 0.117*** 0.031 0.124*** {0.089**
(3.60) (0.92) (3.19) ({2.22)
Age2/100 {0.187*** {0.031 {0.208** 0.229**
({2.86) ({0.44) ({2.42) (2.54)
Age3/1000 0.005 {0.005 0.005 {0.024***
(1.22) ({1.01) (0.86) ({3.95)
Education until less than age 15 Reference
category
Education up to age 16-19 {0.111 {0.209* 0.073 0.016
({1.63) ({1.83) (0.74) (0.17)
Education up to age 20 or more {0.449*** {0.578*** {0.559*** {0.535***
({4.88) ({4.69) ({4.67) ({3.50)
Student {1.339*** {0.710*** {0.983*** {1.118***
({4.33) ({2.64) ({5.57) ({6.68)
Married Reference
category
Single with partner 0.370*** 0.511*** 0.653*** 0.754***
(4.91) (4.86) (7.21) (9.24)
Single 0.405*** 0.297*** 0.766*** 0.477***
(7.51) (2.89) (11.44) (5.39)
Divorced 0.825*** 0.861*** 0.889*** 0.992***
(9.82) (6.41) (15.11) (14.58)
Widowed 0.522*** 0.365** 0.411*** 0.546***
(4.70) (2.42) (4.30) (5.67)
Other marital status 0.292* 0.195 0.318 0.447**
(1.79) (1.19) (1.16) (2.27)
No children in HH under age 15 Reference
category
One child in HH under age 15 {0.099 0.122 {0.111* 0.093
({1.51) (1.30) ({1.73) (1.55)
Two children child in HH under age 15 {0.176** {0.035 {0.303*** 0.063
({2.48) ({0.30) ({4.24) (0.62)
Three children in HH under age 15 {0.221 0.123 {0.273*** {0.113
({1.34) (0.69) ({2.78) ({0.87)
Four children in HH under age 15 {0.023 {0.168 {0.364 {0.04
({0.11) ({0.50) ({1.62) ({0.26)
Manual worker Reference
category
Unemployed 0.354*** 0.441*** 0.204*** 0.501***
(5.12) (2.91) (2.70) (5.16)
Without occupation 0.043 {0.456* {0.044 0.022
(0.18) ({1.73) ({0.53) (0.18)
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Table A.6: (continued)
Retired {0.241** 0.076 {0.067 0.284*
({2.30) (0.77) ({0.50) (1.79)
Farmer/sherman {0.722*** {0.694*** {1.529*** 0.060
({3.39) ({3.07) ({4.54) (0.18)
Professional {0.510*** 0.009 {0.279 0.090
({2.83) (0.04) ({1.26) (0.39)
Self-employed {0.174 {0.027 {0.093 {0.319
({1.34) ({0.18) ({0.65) ({1.31)
Business propriator {0.306*** {0.692*** {0.018 {0.180
({2.80) ({6.42) ({0.09) ({0.60)
Emloyed professional {0.741*** {0.855*** {0.369* {0.362
({4.98) ({5.62) ({1.87) ({1.47)
General management {0.761*** {0.877*** {0.083 {0.586
({5.99) ({3.42) ({0.47) ({1.60)
Middle management {0.676*** {0.481*** {0.375*** {0.634***
({6.23) ({3.84) ({3.72) ({4.88)
Employed position (desk) {0.829*** {0.750*** {0.273** {0.373**
({7.14) ({4.26) ({2.44) ({2.54)
Employed position (travel) {0.222** {0.324** {0.025 0.285
({2.29) ({1.97) ({0.18) (1.52)
Service sector {0.304*** {0.334** {0.223** {0.082
({3.41) ({2.15) ({2.41) ({0.56)
Supervisor {0.136 {0.048 {0.076 {0.202
({0.82) ({0.20) ({0.30) ({0.33)
No. of obs. 18,687 18,687 23,868 23,868
No. of clusters 40 40 40 40
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Notes: Multinomial logit estimations separately for women and men. Z-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
on the country/region level. Country xed eects are included in the regression.
Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, ** :01 < p < :05, *** < :01.
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